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REVENUE AND FINANCE UNDER MONTANA'S
1972 CONSTITUTION
Thomas E. Towe*
The 1972 Montana Constitution brought about momentous
changes in the field of revenue and finance. I submit that we still
are digesting these changes. Consequently, a new constitutional
convention to review and to update article VIII ("Revenue and Fi-
nance") would be premature and unnecessary, at a minimum. This
paper will discuss the changes in article VIII, and explore their
projected impact upon revenue and finance in Montana.
I. NINE CHANGES IN THE REVENUE AND FINANCE ARTICLE
A. Condensing and Shortening the Material
One change, a purely mechanical one, involved consolidating
and condensing three of the articles, including forty-two separate
sections of the 1889 Constitution, into one article containing only
fourteen sections. The articles of the 1889 Constitution consoli-
dated into article VIII of the 1972 Constitution consisted of the
following:
(1) article XII, Revenue and Taxation;
(2) article XIII, Public Indebtedness; and
(3) article XXI, Montana Trust & Legacy Fund.
As Sterling Rygg, Chairman of the Revenue and Finance Commit-
tee of the 1972 Constitutional Convention, stated when introducing
the majority proposal to the delegates: "We were given Articles
XII, XIII and XXI, which had a total of 42 sections. You will note
our proposal has only 14 sections, so we have ... eliminated some
sections, condensed some, and added some new ones. ' Perhaps
the introduction to the Committee Report from the same commit-
tee best expressed the underlying philosophy:
The Revenue and Finance Committee approached its task with a
different attitude. From a pure, theoretical viewpoint, the Consti-
tution does not have to say a thing about taxation. That sugges-
tion was made to the committee on at least two occasions. The
reason is simple-the power to tax is an inherent power of the
* B.A., Earlham College, 1959; L.L.B., University of Montana, 1962; L.L.M., Ge-
orgetown University, 1965; Candidate S.J.D., University of Michigan, 1967. Mr. Towe is a
partner with the Billings, Montana law firm of Towe, Ball, Enright & Mackey.
1. V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1376 (1972) [hereinafter
TRANSCRIPTS].
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state, a power already possessed by the state without any grant of
authority. Anything in a state Constitution on the subject of taxa-
tion is either redundant (reiterating a power already possessed by
the state) or restrictive.
2
Because of this inherent power of a state government to tax, the
drafters of article VIII of the 1972 Constitution believed they could
eliminate much of the prior language. They added some provisions
for emphasis, even though they were considered redundant, and
they added many provisions to restrict the state's power in the
field of revenue and finance.'
B. Statewide Equalization of Property Tax Values
The statewide equalization of the values used for property
taxes represented the most significant change brought about by the
1972 Constitution in the area of taxation. This change resulted
from a procedural change in the process of appraising property for
tax purposes. The impact of this change, genuine equalization, had
escaped reformers over the previous fifty years despite their great
efforts.
The impact of this procedural change was calculated and in-
tentional. The Revenue and Finance Committee reported to the
convention of the large amount of testimony concerning the inade-
quacy of testimony concerning the inadequacy of assessment and
tax equalization in the state:
Hopefully, the inequalities that presently exist within taxing dis-
tricts and between taxing districts can be avoided if accountabil-
ity is in some state agency. Testimony also leads the committee to
believe that pressures and temptations for undervaluation and
under-assessment presently exist at the local level. The current
operation of the school foundation program encourages underval-
uation of local property. When such undervaluation exists, the
state pours in more money for educational purposes.4
If anything, the above words of the committee constitute a modest
understatement. The 1889 Constitution charged the county as-
sessor (an elected official) in each county with the responsibility of
determining the values of all property in the county, which values
were used for tax purposes. The Board of County Commissioners
(elected officials) sitting as the County Board of Equalization then
reviewed and adjusted those values. The State Board of Equaliza-
2. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 579.
3. See V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1376 (introductory remarks by Delegate Rygg).
4. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 589 (committee report).
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tion, a constitutional body, ultimately decided all tax matters.
As the Committee Report indicates, it did not take long for an
elected county official to realize that, by depressing the values of
the property owned by the constituents in his or her county, the
county would receive more state assistance under the School Foun-
dation Program. At the same time, lower values in a county meant
lower taxes paid by the residents of that county. Thus, by keeping
the property values low, the county assessor (and the elected
county commissioners) became local heroes-that county's resi-
dents paid less in taxes and received more money at the same time.
As a result of this local control of the property valuation,
"rules of thumb" developed throughout the state. In Yellowstone
County, for example, a rule of thumb dictated that all residential
real estate be evaluated at forty percent of its true value. In some
counties, this rule of thumb exceeded forty percent; in other coun-
ties it was even less than forty percent. In addition, another Yel-
lowstone County rule of thumb evaluated business inventories at
sixty percent of their true value. Other types of property used
other percentage figures as a rule of thumb. Then, of course, varia-
tions on the same property occurred from county to county.
None of these rules of thumb were supported by statutory law;
they were in addition to and applied before the enactment of the
classification numbers in Revised Codes of Montana 1947, section
84-302. In fact, they appeared to conflict directly with the statu-
tory law. The words "true and full value" used in sections 84-402
and 84-302 seemed clear and explicit.5 Further, section 84-401 ex-
pressly stated: "All taxable property must be assessed at its full
cash value."6 Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme Court stated
that no violation of this section occurred "as long as substantially
the same proportion of the same type of property is subjected to
taxation."7
These rules of thumb generally were unknown and definitely
not public information. In fact, because of the secret numbers, only
a few local and state employees could determine what rule of
thumb each county was using for each type of property. With this
in mind, I introduced House Bill 398 in the 1973 Legislative Ses-
sion. It simply added six words to section 84-401. The words and
not at any percentage thereof at the end of "[a]ll taxable property
must be assessed at its full cash value" would appear unnecessary
5. REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 84-302, -402 (1947).
6. REV. CODES OF MONT. § 84-401 (1947).
7. State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization v. Vanderwood, 146 Mont. 276, 282, 405 P.2d
652, 656 (1965) (emphasis in original).
FINANCE1990] 401
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and certainly nothing more than a clarification of the clear mean-
ing of the statute.8 However, at the hearing on this bill, not only
the State Board of Equalization, but also many civic organizations
(such as the League of Women Voters), testified against the bill on
the grounds that it would absolutely devastate the entire property-
tax system in the state of Montana.9 In effect, it would have elimi-
nated all the rules of thumb. Although House Bill 398 did not pass,
the new Department of Revenue as noted below did accomplish
the same result.
To the credit of the members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion's Revenue and Finance Committee, they fully recognized that
specific words in the constitution would not eliminate the equaliza-
tion problem. They recognized that whether the constitution used
the words true and full value or full cash value, or some other
equally clear and unambiguous terminology, the counties would set
different standards. The only way to ensure a truly equal system of
appraisal of property throughout Montana is to require state level
implementation and state employees-not elected county employ-
ees-assessing all properties. Hence, sections 3 and 4 of article
VIII are clear and unambiguous:
Section 3. Property Tax Administration. The state shall ap-
praise, assess, and equalize the valuation of all property which is
to be taxed in the manner provided by law.'"
Section 4. Equal valuation. All taxing jurisdictions shall use the
assessed valuation of property established by the state."
Implementing these sections was no easy task. The local
county officials did not want to give up their authority, despite the
mandatory and unambiguous language of the 1972 Constitution.
During the 1973 session, in which most of the legislation imple-
menting the new constitutional provisions was acted upon, a major
disagreement developed over the position of county assessors.
These elected public officials with their own lobbyist carried con-
siderable clout. They insisted that the position of county assessor
be retained as an elected county official in spite of (or perhaps
more correctly, in defiance of) the clear mandate of the new consti-
tutional provisions. Further resistance hinged on the counties re-
8. The 1973 session followed the adoption of the 1972 Constitution but, since the new
article VIII said nothing specific about equalization, I thought the bill might be necessary
and certainly within the spirit of the 1972 Constitution.
9. Hearings on H.B. 398, 42nd Leg. (1973); Before the House Taxation Comm., Feb.
26, 1973 (testimony of Montana League of Women Voters).
10. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (emphasis added).
11. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (emphasis added).
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FINANCE
linquishing their control of the appraisal function-a significant
power. The problem was solved by compromise-the county as-
sessor was retained as an elected official, but was placed under the
direction and employment of the Department of Revenue. This so-
lution was quite unworkable in terms of efficient operation of gov-
ernment, but it was the best that could be achieved under the
circumstances.
The difficulties in implementing sections 3 and 4 of article
VIII of the 1972 Constitution during the 1973 legislative session
proved that transfer of the appraisal function from the counties to
the state could not have been accomplished without a constitu-
tional change. Such a change moreover would never have occurred
without a constitutional convention.
The first reappraisal cycle implemented by the Department of
Revenue abolished all rules of thumb. It was not an easy adjust-
ment; the appellate process shouldered thousands of cases. The
valuation used for property-tax purposes in one part of the state
now is essentially equal to the same valuation used in other parts
of the state. This change brought about by the 1972 Constitution
was enormous-perhaps breathtaking in view of the political
implications.
C. Unified Investment of Public Funds
The impact of mandating that "[tihe legislature shall provide
for a unified investment program for public funds"12 is nearly as
great as the impact of placing the appraisal and assessment of all
property in the hands of one state agency.' 3
Before the 1972 Constitution, a number of different agencies
actually made the investment decisions even though the state trea-
surer generally was charged with handling the state's money. Thus,
the Teacher Retirement Board invested the teacher retirement
funds, and the Public Employees' Retirement Board invested the
Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) monies. The justices
of the Montana Supreme Court were constitutionally appointed as
the Supervisory Board for the administration of the Montana
Trust and Legacy Fund. In addition, many agencies enjoyed virtu-
ally blanket authority to invest their own funds in their own
manner.
Perhaps more significantly, investment income was not always
12. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 13.
13. [For a discussion of the current status of the investment of Montana's public
funds, see Fitzgerald, Montana's Constitutionally Established Investment Program: A
State Investing Against Itself, supra this issue.] ED.
1990]
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the most important factor-or even a factor-considered in mak-
ing investment decisions. Large sums of money belonging to the
state government simply were deposited in non-interest bearing ac-
counts in Montana banks throughout the state. This represented
something of a government plum doled out by the treasurer to "de-
serving" Montana banks. It was not uncommon for a bank to com-
plain to the state treasurer that it was not receiving its share of
state deposits. The state then would increase its deposits in the
non-interest bearing account at that bank. At zero percent interest,
investment return obviously was not a criterion for determining
who was to receive these deposits.
The 1972 Constitution changed this. Now, almost fifteen per-
cent of the General Fund budget for the state each year-more
than 65 million dollars per year-comes from the unified invest-
ment system established under article VIII, section 13 of the 1972
Constitution." ' The Board of Investments now manages more than
3 billion dollars in assets. 15 One of the world's largest investors, it
is managed very professionally by highly skilled and well-paid pro-
fessional investors. It makes the investment decisions, and it re-
ceives top-investment dollar for all state investments, including
the Teacher Retirement System funds, the PERS funds, the Coal
Tax Trust funds, the Trust and Legacy funds, the Short Term In-
vestment Pool, and all other funds managed by the state. The
Short Term Investment Pool (STIP) is open to local governments
and effectively has created a market in Montana for short term
investment of public funds. The highest rates paid by banks and
other financial institutions closely correspond to the current STIP
rate.
Unlike the equalization of property-tax appraisals, the Unified
Investment System might have originated without the change in
the constitution. Progressive legislators such as Representative
Francis Bardanouve long had been pushing for such a unified in-
vestment system designed to obtain greater revenue from the use
of state funds. Nevertheless, it took a constitutional change to
bring it about, and the results, again, are breathtaking.
D. Limitations on State Indebtedness
The 1889 Constitution limited all state debt to 100,000 dollars
without a vote of the people. 6 Borrowing money or floating a bond
14. The 1990 fiscal year budget includes $67 million in interest income from the state's
investments-about 15.4% of the total budget.
15. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, 1987-88 FiscAL YEAR REPORT.
16. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, § 2.
[Vol. 51
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issue, even when approved overwhelmingly by the people, repre-
sented a cumbersome and time consuming affair. Using the state's
good credit for short term advantage or arbitrage was impossible.
Section 8 of article VIII of the 1972 Constitution changed this.
It abolished the 100,000 dollars limitation, and it added a simple
requirement that the bond issue be approved by a two-third's
vote"' of the members of each house of the legislature. In other
words, in addition to a vote by the people, state indebtedness now
can be created by a two-third's vote of each house of the legisla-
ture. In terms of modern finance, this provision brought Montana
into the last half of the twentieth century. The legislature fre-
quently approves bond issues, and arbitrage income s is specifically
authorized and used to great advantage by the state."9
E. Local Debt Limitations
The 1889 Constitution also limited debts of counties, cities
and other local governments. It limited counties and municipalities
to indebtedness that did not exceed five percent of their taxable
valuation (cities and towns, however, could exceed that limit for
sewer and water systems upon a vote of the people), and counties
could not incur any indebtedness in excess of 10,000 dollars with-
out a vote of the people.2"
Section 10 of article VIII in the 1972 Constitution places no
constitutional limits on debts of counties, cities, towns and other
local governmental entities. It does, however, authorize the legisla-
ture to impose such limits. The legislature, in fact, has placed limi-
tations on local government indebtedness similar to those that ex-
isted in the previous constitution.2' Consequently, the area of local
government finance has not yet experienced the full impact of the
17. Interestingly, the Committee Report of the Revenue and Finance Committee of
the constitutional convention proposed a "3/5's" vote of "both" houses of the legislature.
Both items were changed on the floor of the convention. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at
1492, 1503-04. It appears that the change from "both" houses of the legislature to "each"
house of the legislature was intended merely as a clarification amendment, even though it
had a very substantive effect. V TRANSCRIPrS, supra note 1, at 1492.
18. "Arbitrage" is defined as "ft]he simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in
another of a security or commodity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the
different markets." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 95 (5th ed. 1979).
19. Starting in 1979, the legislature authorized the sale of Tax and Revenue Anticipa-
tion Notes (TRANS), which allows the state to borrow funds in anticipation of incoming
revenue at very low rates. MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-5-805 (1989). The same money then can be
invested at much higher rates for a net arbitrage income to the state.
20. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, §§ 5, 6.
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change contemplated by the framers of the 1972 Montana
Constitution.
F. Highway Revenue Non-Diversion
Substantial changes resulted in the Highway Non-diversion
Amendment.2 First, it limits the number of taxes placed into the
Highway Fund to taxes on fuel and gross vehicle weight fees. No
longer are the fees collected on the sale of new cars added to the
Highway Fund.
Second, it expands the permissible use of funds earmarked for
highways to include local government road and street systems,
highway-safety programs, driver-education programs and tourist
promotion. This substantial change helped to improve city streets,
highway-safety programs, driver-education programs and tourist
promotion.23
Third, and most significantly, the new non-diversion amend-
ment no longer is absolute. Upon a three-fifth's vote of the mem-
bers of each house of the legislature, the non-diversion can be bro-
ken.24 To date, no such vote has occurred, but the possibility does
exist.
Changing from an absolute prohibition2 5 to a permissive diver-
sion on a three-fifth's vote of each house of the legislature repre-
sents a significant change in policy. It is an understatement to say
that the impact of this change on the state of Montana has not yet
been fully appreciated or realized.
G. Tax-Exempt Property
Article VIII, section 5 of the 1972 Montana Constitution made
several significant changes relating to property that may be exempt
from property taxation. First, exemptions for property of the
22. The Highway Non-diversion Amendment, adopted by the voters in 1956, is found
in article XII, § l(b) of the 1889 Constitution. It is found in article VIII, § 6 of the 1972
Constitution.
23. The 1889 Constitution allowed the use of highway funds for "dissemination of
public information relating to the public highways, roads, streets and bridges of the State of
Montana and the use thereof." MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XII, § l(b). Under this authority
the state tourism budget was funded by highway funds before the 1972 Constitution was
adopted. Now, however, express authority exists for tourist-promotion expenditures from
the highway funds. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(l)(c).
24. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(2).
25. The voters adopted the anti-diversion amendment in a constitutional amendment
placed on the ballot in 1956. Consequently, it does not date back to the original 1889 Con-
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United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts,
municipal corporations and public libraries, mandated by the 1889
Constitution with the word "shall," are now permissive with the
use of the word "may" in the 1972 Constitution.
Second, any private interest in any tax-exempt property now
may be taxed separately.26 This practice developed before the
adoption of the 1972 Constitution, but at that time was not clearly
lawful. 7 Perhaps the most hotly contested use of this new power is
the attempt to tax the high-voltage transmission lines owned by
the federal government but beneficially used by the Montana
Power Company and other associated utilities.2"
Third, charges for capital improvements and maintenance of
improvements financed by special improvement district indebted-
ness may be levied directly against property otherwise exempt
from property taxes.2 9 This, too, was unclear under the 1889 Con-
stitution, even though it frequently occurred.
Finally, the 1972 Constitution authorizes the legislature to ex-
empt "any other classes of property."30 In other words, under the
1972 Constitution, the legislature may create any exemption from
property taxes it chooses, and the constitution does not limit the
purposes for which the legislature may grant such an exemption.
A minority report signed by Delegates Mike McKeon, William
H. Art and Morris Driscoll examined the wisdom of such a provi-
sion. The minority report suggested that the new provision
"open[ed] the door too wide,". placed too much discretion in the
hands of the legislature, and that the provision should limit the
right of the legislature to grant exemptions." Indeed, shortly after
the adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the legislature exempted all
household furnishings, intangible property, business inventory, and
a number of other items that it considered difficult to identify and
to appraise. A perusal of Montana Code Annotated sections 15-6-
201 to -215 reveals the rather extensive use of this exemption au-
26. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(a); see also II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 590 (com-
mittee report).
27. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 590 (committee report).
28. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-24-1205 to -1207 (1989). Currently, this debate is on
appeal to the Montana Supreme Court (No. 90-212) from the First Judicial District Court of
Montana, Judge Loble presiding. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Department of Revenue,
ADV-86-069, ADV-87-081, ADV-87-023 (decided Feb. 2, 1990) (utilities involved as party-
plaintiffs include Washington Water Power Co., Portland General Electric Co. and the Mon-
tana Power Co.). That court resolved the issue in favor of the state and permitted the tax on
the utilities' beneficial use of the transmission lines.
29. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(2).
30. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(1)(c).
31. See II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 599-601.
1990]
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thority that the legislature has taken. The far-reaching impact of
this section of the constitution, however, has not yet been fully re-
alized and we certainly will see much activity in this area in the
future.
H. An Independent Appeal System
The framers of the Revenue and Finance Article of the 1972
Constitution intended to establish an independent appeal system
separate from the old County Boards of Equalization and the old
State Board of Equalization. As stated in the Committee Report:
Under the present tax administration program, the same govern-
mental bodies (County Boards of Equalization and State Board of
Equalization) that establish revenue policies and procedures also
sit in judgment on the implementation of those procedures. Over-
whelming testimony to the committee indicates that the proce-
dure does not guarantee an independent, non-partial, objective
review of tax decisions. The Montana taxpayer needs some ave-
nue of recourse, besides the tax administrator or the courts, to
evaluate his [or her] tax treatment. The proposed section accom-
plishes that objective by establishing an independent review
procedure. 3
2
Interestingly, the lengthy detail proposed by the Revenue and Fi-
nance Committee to the convention floor was replaced with a very
simple directive to the legislature to establish and to provide an
independent appeal procedure.
3 3
Indeed, the legislature has established an independent system
starting with the County Tax Appeal Board and ending with the
State Tax Appeal Board. As the reports of the Tax Appeal Board
indicate, the independent system has received extensive use. In
just one issue-the so-called thirty-four percent cases--the Tax
Appeal Board entertained and processed more than 6,000 appeals
by persons protesting the valuation placed on their property. The
County Tax Appeal Board and State Tax Appeal Board are recog-
nized as significant parts of the total administration of the tax laws
in the state of Montana.
I. Other Trust Funds
Any discussion of revenue and finance would be incomplete
without referring to trust funds established by amendment to the
1972 Constitution. In particular, the Coal Tax Constitutional Trust
32. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 593-94.
33. See id. at 592-93 (committee report); V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 1, at 1489-90.
[Vol. 51408
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Fund established in article IX, section 5 (the Environment and
Natural Resources Article) has significantly contributed to the fi-
nances of the state of Montana. The Coal Tax Trust Fund, which
since 1979 has received fifty percent of all severance taxes collected
on coal mined in the state of Montana, currently contains more
than 400 million dollars " and produces over 40 million dollars in
income for the General Fund each year. A constitutional referen-
dum adopted by the voters in November 1976 established this con-
stitutional trust fund. Its impact on the state of Montana also is
enormous.
Additionally, the Resource Indemnity Trust Fund established
in the Environment and Natural Resources Article merits discus-
sion. 5 Voters adopted it in 1974 as the very first amendment to
the 1972 Constitution. The Fund now contains only about 70 mil-
lion dollars,3" but it is scheduled to accumulate until it reaches at
least 100 million dollars.
3 7
Finally, the legislature created two statutory trust funds as a
result of the Coal Tax adopted in the 1975 Legislative Session: (1)
the Local Impact and Educational Trust Fund;38 and (2) the Park
Acquisition, Capitol Art, and Cultural Projects Trust Fund.39 Ac-
tions taken in the 1987 and 1989 Legislatures have depleted the
Educational Trust Fund account. Many believe that these actions
justify constitutional protection for any permanent trust fund.40
The impact of these coal-trust funds, even though not a part of the
original 1972 Constitution, is momentous and cannot be
overlooked.
II. MORE TIME Is NEEDED TO DIGEST THESE ENORMOUS CHANGES
A new constitutional convention certainly is not necessary in
the area of revenue and finance. The enormous changes of the 1972
Constitution still have not been fully implemented. For example,
even though authorized by the 1972 Constitution, no real change in
34. The Permanent Trust Fund (including the Instate Investment Fund) is projected
to contain $456.3 million by the end of the next biennium (June 30, 1991).
35. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) (1974).
36. It is projected to contain $76.6 million by the end of the current biennium (June
30, 1991).
37. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2, 3.
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-108 (3)(a) (1975).
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-108 (3)(e) (1975). This fund is projected to contain $18.6
million by the end of the current biennium (June 30, 1991).
40. See also the Instate Investment Fund, MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-306 (1989), and
the Bond Fund, MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-5-703 (1989), both of which are an integral part of
the Permanent Constitutional Trust Fund.
1990] 409
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the state debt limitations of local governments has occurred. Simi-
larly, the legislature has not implemented the changes in the anti-
diversion amendment regarding highway funds. The legislature has
merely scratched the surface of the broad authority granted it with
regard to exemption of property from property taxes. The State
Tax Appeal Board now is returning to normal after fully imple-
menting a new, separate and independent appeal system for tax-
payers in the state of Montana. In the area of property tax exemp-
tions, we can expect much more from the legislature under the
existing constitutional provision. The legislature has not fully ad-
dressed the sticky problems of what religious and charitable prop-
erty should be entitled to an exemption from property taxes, and
what type of property is entitled to such an exemption. "1
The 1972 Montana Constitution has engendered a much
greater public awareness of the inequalities in our tax system. The
thousands of appeals to the State Tax Appeal Board caused by the
first major cyclical appraisal system show that Montana taxpayers
are much more aware of these inequalities and are prepared to do
something about them. The recent focus on the classification sys-
tem, which classifies all property for property tax purposes, indi-
cates this growing awareness of inequality.42 The simplicity of the
Revenue and Finance Article of the 1972 Constitution, however, is
broad enough to encompass this new public awareness. Because of
the conscious effort to place more discretion in the legislature with
fewer limitations in the constitution, the legislature has the tools
to address this greater public awareness.
Even though the enormous changes in the Revenue and Fi-
nance Article of the 1972 Constitution have left much work for the
legislature, no need exists, because of the simplicity and farsight-
edness of the section itself, to make any substantial changes in the
constitutional language. The article will serve as a guide to the leg-
islature and the people of this state through the next several de-
cades without any substantial changes. To rewrite this article at
the present time would be a giant step backward.
41. The Revenue Oversight Committee did address this question briefly in its interim
study of property tax exemptions following the 1983 legislative session. However, the Reve-
nue Oversight Committee was far too occupied with other issues to focus on the overriding
public policy issues involved in this section of the constitution. See generally, REVENUE &
OVERSIGHT CoMMITTEE, MONTANA'S PROPERTY TAX & THE 4-R ACT & OTHER REVENUE OVER-
SIGHT ISSUES: REPORT TO THE 49TH LEGISLATURE (1985).
42. See, e.g., S.B. 48, 49th Leg. (1985) (attempt to reduce personal property taxes for
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